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STATE:MENT OF THE CASE 
A. Introduction 
Appellants Boise Baseball, LLC, Boise Hawks Baseball Club, LLC and Home Plate Food 
Services, LLC (collectively "the Boise Hawks") request that the Court (1) adopt the limited duty 
rule (i.e., the baseball rule); and (2) find that primary implied assumption of risk remains a viable 
defense in Idaho. 
In his response, Respondent Bud Rountree puts forth two main arguments. First, 
Mr. Rountree contends that the limited duty rule distinguishes between so-called Open-Bleacher 
Seating and Multi-Purposes Areas, and the modem trend is to reject the limited duty rule. In 
fact, the trend in both past and modem decisions has been to adopt the limited duty rule. 
Likewise, those decisions do not distinguish between so-called Open-Bleacher Seating and 
Multi-Purposes Areas. l Second, Mr. Rountree contends that primary implied assumption of risk 
has been abolished in Idaho. However, notwithstanding Mr. Rountree's arguments to the 
contrary, there is a conflict between the language in Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 695 P.2d 
369 (1985) and Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 777 P.2d 722 (1989) as to whether primary 
implied assumption of risk remains a viable defense in Idaho. 
The limited duty rule should be adopted because it provides parties with clear guidance 
on foul ball litigation by striking a balance between safety and preserving the essential character 
1 Mr. Rountree cites the Court to a single decision which remains good law and makes 
such a distinction. See Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 148 N.M. 646, 241 P.3d 1086 (2010). 
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(including the innate risks) of baseball. Although this duty has slight variations in different 
jurisdictions, there is essentially national consensus that stadium owners and operators should not 
be held liable for injuries to spectators caused by foul balls leaving the field of play at baseball 
games so long as there is adequate safety screening to protect spectators behind home plate, 
where the danger is most pronounced. 
The Boise Hawks respectfully request that the Court define the parameters of foul ball 
litigation in Idaho and provide these and all future parties with clear guidance on this issue. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
For the sake of brevity, the Boise Hawks refer the Court to the Statement of the Facts 
section of Appellants' Brief for an accurate and thorough summary of the facts. (See Appellants' 
Brief, pp. 2-17.) 
The Statement of the Case section of Respondent's Brief is approximately 17 pages in 
length and at least half of it concentrates on the affidavit of Mr. Rountree's human factors expert, 
Joellen Gill. (See Respondent's Brief, pp. 1-17.) As discussed in Defendants' Objection and 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Joellen Gill and Portions of the Affidavit of Bud Rountree in the 
underlying proceedings, Ms. Gill's affidavit is littered with conjecture, conclusory allegations as 
to ultimate facts, conclusions of law, statements based on hearsay, statements that lack adequate 
foundation, and statements not made on personal knowledge. (See Obj. and Mot. to Str. Aff. of 
Joellen Gill and Port. of the Aff. of Bud Rountree, R. Vol. I., pp. 750-65.) Likewise, 
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Mr. Rountree's affidavit contains many of these same deficiencies. (See id.) Moreover, some of 
the statements made in Respondent's Brief are not supported by citation, and in many instances 
where a citation is used it does not say what Mr. Rountree says it does, it is a statement taken out 
of context, or it is a mis-quoted statement. For instance, Ms. Leek's testimony is taken out of 
context when Mr. Rountree states that "Ms. Leek testified that her family ate all of the food that 
they brought to the game in the Executive Club area." (See Respondent's Brief, p. 44.) While 
there was some confusion as to whether counsel's questions pertained to the dining area, the 
Hawks Nest, or the viewing area, the Executive Club, Ms. Leek's testimony was that she did not 
eat food in the Executive Club. (See Evett Aff., Ex. D (Deposition of Lisa Leek), 14:10-16:25, R. 
Vol. I, p. 490.) Rather, she was only in the Executive Club for five to ten minutes prior to 
Mr. Rountree being hit by a foul ball. (See id. at 16:11-25, R. Vol. I, p. 490.) According to 
Ms. Leek, immediately prior to Mr. Rountree being hit by a foul ball, she left her family in the 
Hawks Nest and entered the Executive Club to momentarily watch the game without the 
obstruction of barrier netting. (See id. at 15:5-15, R. Vol. I, p. 490.) 
In another instance, Mr. Rountree makes the statement that "the Executive Club is 
connected to the lower section of the Hawks Nest..." (See Respondent's Brief, p. 4.) The 
affidavit of Mr. Rahr, however, clearly illustrates that the Executive Club is a separate area 
adjacent to the Hawks Nest. (See Rahr Aff., fI[ 8-12, R. Vol. I, p. 551). In fact, the Executive 
Club and the Hawks Nest have separate entrances. (See id.) 
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In yet another instance, the statement "Mr. Rountree did not hear anyone shout out a 
warning" is used to support the statement that "[f]rom this fact there arises an inference that few 
if any people saw the line-drive foul ball approach, or someone would have shouted a warning." 
(See Respondent's Brief, p. 7.) Upon closer examination, however, Ms. Ballard and Ms. Leek 
both testified they saw the ball corning and Ms. Leek even testified that she yelled "look out." 
(See Evett Aff., Ex. D (Deposition Transcript of Lisa Leek), 24:4-23, R. Vol. I, p. 492; and Evett 
Aff., Ex. B (Deposition Transcript of Linda Ballard), 46:18-19, R. Vol. I, p. 465.) 
In yet another instance, Mr. Rountree cites to his wife's deposition transcript to support 
the statement that his eye was "gushing" blood. (See Respondent's Brief, p. 7.) None of the 
citations support the statement that his eye was "gushing" blood. In fact, in response to the Boise 
Hawks' counsel's question of whether Mr. Rountree's eye was profusely bleeding, Ms. Ballard 
specifically testified "[ w ] ell to me, profuse bleeding is just gushing. But, no, it was bleeding, and 
it was bad, but it wasn't massive." (See Evett Mf., Ex. B (Deposition Transcript of Linda 
Ballard), 50:22-51:1, R. Vol. I, p. 466.) There are a number of other instances of this throughout 
Respondent's Brief.2 
Furthermore, Mr. Rountree attached several photographs to his affidavit but did not lay a 
proper foundation for the photos. For instance, it appears most of the photos were taken prior to 
2 Regardless of Mr. Rountree's mis-characterizations of the record, it is important for the 
Court to recognize that these facts are irrelevant to whether the Court should adopt the limited 
duty rule, or whether primary implied assumption of risk remains a viable defense in Idaho. 
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the start of a baseball game, which this is an important detail considering food and beverage are 
not served in the Executive Club after baseball games start, and many of the photos are of the 
Hawks Nest, not the Executive Club. (See Rountree Aff., Exs., 1,2,5,6, 7 and 8, R. Vol I, 
pp. 608-23.) 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Should Adopt the Limited Duty Rule and Find That Appellants 
Complied with it. 
1. This Is a Case About Competing Views of Society. 
The Boise Hawks acknowledge this is a case about competing visions of the type of 
society we live in. Mr. Rountree's vision of society is one populated by signs and audible 
warnings to tell people what they already know. It is a society where people need to be protected 
from themselves and their own inattention by someone else. It is simultaneously a society where 
too much protection is as, or more, dangerous than not providing enough protection, which is the 
point of loellen Gill's affidavit. In Mr. Rountree's society, everything is situational; therefore, it 
is impossible to know what the secret recipe is for avoiding liability. 
The society envisioned by the baseball rule is one where people expect some level of 
protection, but also understand that they are expected to take responsibility for their own actions 
or inactions. It is a society that understands and embraces individual decisions whether to engage 
in certain activities that inherently may result in injury. It is a society where people do not need 
to be repeatedly told what they already know. 
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The various positions taken by Mr. Rountree in this lawsuit demonstrate why every single 
jurisdiction in addressing similar situations has adopted the limited duty rule in some form. To 
illustrate, Mr. Rountree asserts two inconsistent, irreconcilable positions, which the adoption of 
the limited duty rule would preclude. First, Mr. Rountree asserts that a baseball field with the 
least amount of netting is safer than a field with extensive netting because spectators not 
protected by netting will be hyper alert. (See Respondent's Brief, p. 12.) Mr. Rountree then 
simultaneously takes the opposite position - that it "would have taken very little effort" for the 
Boise Hawks to provide vertical barrier netting in front of the Executive Club. (See Respondent's 
Brief, p. 15.) 
These contradictory positions illustrate that without the limited duty rule, the baseball 
club owner or operator is in an unwinnable situation because netting too much results in liability, 
but netting too little results in liability. 
Mr. Rountree also takes the position that even though the Boise Hawks stop serving food 
and beverages in the Executive Club when the baseball game begins, the Boise Hawks should 
have warned "those already seated and eating in that area [to] discontinue doing so, or to re-
orient themselves so that there [sic] eyes do not leave the field of play." (See Respondent's Brief, 
p. 13.) Likewise, Mr. Rountree takes the position that he did not "observe any warning not to 
enter" the Executive Club "with food or drink, and there was no warning not to turn your back to 
the game or to sit or stand so that you could observe home plate at all times." (See Respondent's 
Brief, p. 5.) It is unclear why it would have been necessary for the Boise Hawks to warn 
-6-
Mr. Rountree to not eat or drink in the Executive Club, to throw his food and drink away if he 
were eating or drinking, and/or re-orient himself towards the field of play under the present 
circumstances because it is undisputed that while in the Executive Club, Mr. Rountree was not 
sitting, eating, or drinking when the foul ball hit him in his right eye. (See Evett Aff., Ex. A 
(Deposition of Bud Rountree), 66:7-17; 74:8-16; and 101:23-25, R. Vol. I, pp. 441; 443; and 
450.) Nonetheless, these positions are another good illustration of how the Boise Hawks are in 
an unwinnable situation and, in Mr. Rountree's view, are at fault for not warning Mr. Rountree to 
not do things he was not doing anyway. 
It is also important to recognize that throughout Respondent's Brief, Mr. Rountree uses 
words and phrases such as "misled," "lured," "lulled," his "attention was diverted," he was 
"invited to disregard the game," among others, in describing how the Boise Hawks should have 
protected him from foul balls. (See Respondent's Brief, pp. 13,23, 36 and 39.) In fact, 
Mr. Rountree states that "one doubts whether even an express general release of liability would 
apply in a situation where patrons are lured into what appears to be an area furnished with 
protective netting and circular tables where patrons are invited to divert their attention from the 
game." (ld. at p. 36, fn. 14.) Use of language such as "misled" and "lured" under these 
circumstances is not just another good illustration of how the baseball club owner or operator is 
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in an unwinnable situation, it is an illustration of Mr. Rountree's unwillingness to accept any 
responsibility for not watching the game.3 
The Boise Hawks are asking the Court to draw a line. Mr. Rountree is asking for no 
lines, or, a line that means every time a spectator is hit by a foul ball at a baseball game it must be 
presented to a jury. The limited duty rule is a compromise. Baseball club owners and operators 
make money by putting on a game that can be dangerous to watch and play. Spectators enjoy 
watching this dangerous game, and every once in a while get hit by a foul ball. The limited duty 
rule provides a bright line test that allows the Boise Hawks to continue to put on baseball games 
without compromising the nature of the game. 
The simple fact is that baseballs fly around baseball stadiums. Foul balls can go into the 
stands, concession and viewing areas, parking lots, walkways, and other areas in or around a 
baseball stadium. The limited duty rule ensures spectators who desire protection from foul balls 
3 It is undisputed that Mr. Rountree has been a Boise Hawks' season ticket holder since 
1989 and has attended at least 200 baseball games at Memorial Stadium. (See Evett Mf., Ex. A 
(Deposition of Bud Rountree), 34:13-21; 43:18-25; and 44:12-45:6, R. Vol. I, pp. 433; 435; and 
436.) It is also undisputed that Mr. Rountree knew foul balls are common to the game of 
baseball, that foul balls frequently enter the areas surrounding the field of play, and that, as a 
spectator, if you are not paying attention to the field of play, there is a possibility of getting hit by 
a foul ball. (See Evett Aff., Ex. A (Deposition of Bud Rountree), 50: 16-51:15 and 53:6-10, 
R. Vol. I, pp. 437-38.) It is additionally undisputed that Mr. Rountree had been in the Executive 
Club on several prior occasions. (See Evett Mf., Ex. A (Deposition of Bud Rountree), 68:22-24, 
R. Vol. I, p. 441; See also Evett Aff., Ex. C (Deposition of Albert Stanton Tollinger), 17:12-18:5, 
R. Vol. I, p. 479.) 
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have it, while simultaneously protecting a baseball club owner or operator from foul ball liability 
- without changing the nature of the game. 
2. The Court Has the Power to Develop Common Law Duty Rules and Has 
Chosen to Do So on Many Prior Occasions. 
Regarding adoption of the limited duty rule, the district court ruled that Ruffing v. Ada 
County Paramedics, 145 Idaho 943, 188 P.3d 885 (2008) permits only the Legislature to make 
duty determinations. (See Mem. Dec. on Defs' Mot. for Summ. J., R. Vol. I, pp. 804-12.) 
The Court has never ruled that the Legislature's occasional forays into insulating certain 
entities or individuals from liability prevents courts in Idaho from developing common law duty 
rules. Mr. Rountree presumably ignores this fact in Respondent's Brief because it is clear Idaho 
courts have the power to develop common law duty rules and have chosen to do so on many prior 
occasions under a long line of cases. See, e.g., Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 223, 192 P.3d 
1036, 1047 (2008) ("Whether a duty exists is a question of law"); Bramwell v. South Rigby 
Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648,650,39 P.3d 588,590 (2001) ("fu negligence actions, the 
determination of whether there is a duty is a question of law to be decided by the court"); Turpen 
v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999) ("Existence of duty is a question of 
law"); Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 556, 808 P.2d 1300, 1301 (1991) ("The question of 
whether a legal duty in fact exists is a question of law for the court to decide"). 
fu fact, it was the Court, not the Legislature, that decided to adopt the fireman's rule in 
Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 777 P.2d 722 (1989). From a procedural standpoint, this appeal 
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is identical to Winn. In Winn, the defendants asked the district court to adopt the fireman's rule. 
The district court declined and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court 
then accepted those defendants' permissive appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12 and 
adopted the fIreman's rule. 
As discussed in Appellants' Brief, if courts in Idaho are not permitted to adopt common 
law duty rules, as the district court suggests in its Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment entered on May 23,2011, then a long line of cases, including Turpen, 
have effectively been overruled. 
Mr. Rountree also argues in Respondent's Brief that because some states have codified 
the limited duty rule, the Boise Hawks "might more appropriately take their concerns to the 
legislature." (See Respondent's Brief, pp. 30-31.) As discussed supra, the Court has never ruled 
that the Legislature's occasional forays into insulating certain entities/individuals from liability 
prevents courts in Idaho from developing common law duty rules. More importantly, it appears 
most, if not all, jurisdictions that have codified the limited duty rule in some form only did so 
after the limited duty rule was adopted in some form via common law. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-554 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-43 - 2A:53A-48 (2006); 745 ILL. 
COMPo STAT. ANN. 38/1 (1992).4 
4 These statutes appear to simply further define the parameters of how the limited duty 
rule will apply in these jurisdictions and draw no distinction between Open-Bleacher Seating and 
Multi-Purpose Areas. 
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The Court has the power to adopt the limited duty rule and should do so under these 
circumstances. 
3. Every Jurisdiction Having Addressed this Situation Has Adopted the 
Limited Duty Rule in Some Form. 
Mr. Rountree suggests throughout Respondent's Brief that the limited duty rule "is 
rapidly being abandoned." (See Respondent's Brief, p. 45.) Mr. Rountree, however, has not cited 
to a single jurisdiction that has chosen not to adopt the limited duty rule in some form, or 
"abandoned" the limited duty rule after it was adopted. 
Every jurisdiction having addressed this situation has adopted the limited duty rule in 
some form.5 Despite Mr. Rountree's contentions to the contrary, the New Mexico Supreme 
5 See generally James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Liability to Spectator at Baseball Game Who Is 
Hit by Ball or Injured as Result of Other Hazards of Game, 91 A.L.R.3d 24 (1979 & 
Supp.2003); See also Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entertainment, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172 (Nev. 
2008); Lawson ex rei. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1995); Bellezzo 
v. State, 174 Ariz. 548, 851 P.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1992); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-554 (1999) 
(statutorily adopted limited duty rule); Hunt v. Portland Baseball Club, 207 Or. 337,296 P.2d 
495 (Or. 1956); Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 441 N.Y.S.2d 644,424 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 
1981); Sparks v. Sterling Doubleday Enterprises, LP, 752 N.Y.S.2d 79 (N.Y.S. Ct. App. Div. 
2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-120 (1994) (statutorily adopted limited duty rule); 
Sciarrotta v. Global Spectrum, 194 N.J. 345,944 A.2d 630 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-
43 - 2A:53A-48 (2006) (statutorily adopted limited duty rule); Arnold v. City of Cedar Rapids, 
443 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1989); Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co., 16 La.App. 
95,133 So. 408 (1931); 745 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 3811 (1992) (statutorily adopted limited duty 
rule); Costa v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 299, 809 N.E.2d 1090 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2004); Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 246 Mich.App. 645, 635 N.W.2d 219 (2001); 
Alwin v. St. Paul Saints Baseball Club, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Anderson 
v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Mo. 1950); Erickson v. Lexington Baseball 
Club, 233 N.C. 627,65 S.E.2d 140 (1951); Hobby v. City of Durham and Durham Bulls Baseball 
Club, Inc., 569 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, 112 OhioSt. 
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Court in Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 148 N.M. 646, 241, P.3d 1086 (2010) adopted a 
limited duty rule in the baseball setting, albeit in a variation not recognized by other jurisdictions 
and one that ultimately did not protect the baseball club owner and operator from liability. 
Mr. Rountree directs the Court to Maisonave v. Newark Bears Professional Baseball 
Club, Inc., 185 N.J. 70, 881 A.2d 700 (2005), to support his contention that the limited duty rule 
"is rapidly being abandoned." Maisonave, however, has no precedential value as it was 
superceded by statute, the New Jersey Baseball Spectator Safety Act of 2006, which adopted the 
limited duty rule in its traditional form. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-43 (2006). 
Mr. Rountree's reliance on Maisonave is further misplaced because there, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court adopted the limited duty rule. While the Maisonave Court did limit the 
applicability of the rule to the geographic area of the "stands," it then defined "stands" to include 
stairways and adjacent viewing areas. 185 N.J. at 81, 881 A.2d at 707. While the Maisonave 
Court did not adopt the limited duty rule in its traditional form, it nonetheless adopted a limited 
duty rule in the baseball setting - a variation that arguably would protect the Boise Hawks under 
these circumstances, given the fact that Mr. Rountree was hit in a viewing area. 
175, 147 N.E. 86 (1925); Pakett v. The Phillies, L.P., 871 A.2d 304 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005); 
Friedman v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 731 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App. 1987); Tite v. Omaha Coliseum 
Corp., 144 Neb. 22 (Neb. 1943); Perry v. Seattle School Dist. No.1, 66 Wash.2d 800, 405 P.2d 
589 (1965); Moulas v. PBC Productions Inc., 217 Wis.2d 449,576 N.W.2d 929 (1998); 
Thurman v. Prince Williams Professional Baseball Club, Inc., 265 Va. 59, 574 S.E.2d 246 
(2003). 
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The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Edward C. was premised upon the 
rationale set forth in Maisonave, a case that was superseded by statute and has no precedential 
value (as discussed supra). Mr. Rountree now borrows his position in this lawsuit from Edward 
C, the only case to draw a distinction between so-called Open-Bleacher Seating and Multi-
Purpose Areas that has any remaining precedential value. 
Even then, the facts of Edward C. are distinguishable from the facts of this lawsuit on 
many levels, including the following: (1) the injury did not occur while the game was being 
played so it would be unreasonable to expect the injured party to keep their attention directed 
towards the field of play; (2) the injury occurred in a picnic area set up for pre-game activities in 
"fair ball territory"; (3) the picnic area was utilized in "fair ball territory" while the baseball 
teams were warming up on the field of play; (4) the injury occurred while the injured party was 
sitting down facing away from the field of play; and (5) the injured party was eating and drinking 
at the time of the injury. 
Neither Edward C. nor Maisonave support Mr. Rountree's contention that the limited 
duty rule "is rapidly being abandoned." Rather, there is ample case law to suggest the modem 
trend has been to adopt the limited duty rule in its traditional form. See, e.g., Turner v. Mandalay 
Sports Entertainment, UC, 180 P.3d 1172 (Nev. 2008); Lawson ex reI. Lawson v. Salt Lake 
Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1995); Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 246 Mich.App. 645, 
635 N.W.2d 219 (2001). 
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Although cases in other jurisdictions have turned on a variety of different forms of the 
limited duty rule, they reflect a consensus that baseball club owners or operators should not be 
held liable for injuries to spectators that result from baseballs leaving the field of play - at least if 
adequate safety screening has been provided to protect areas of the stadium in the vicinity of 
home plate, where the danger is thought to be most acute. See generally James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., 
Liability to Spectator at Baseball Game Who Is Hit by Ball or Injured as Result of Other 
Hazards of Game, 91 A.L.R.3d 24 (1979 & Supp.2003). The Court should adopt a limited duty 
rule for the same reasons that the vast majority of other jurisdictions have - because it strikes a 
balance between safety and preserving the essential character of baseball. 
4. The Limited Duty RuIe Does Not Distinguish Between So-Called Open-
Bleacher Seating and Multi-Purpose Areas. 
In Respondent's Brief, Mr. Rountree takes the position that the case law cited by the 
Boise Hawks in Appellants' Brief distinguishes between so-called Open-Bleacher Seating and 
MUlti-Purpose Areas. (See Respondent's Brief, pp. 28-30.) Mr. Rountree cites to the following 
cases in support of this position: Phelps v. State, 2005 WL 2205633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 
2005); Maisonave v. Newark Bears Professional Baseball Club, Inc., 185 N.J. 70, 881 A.2d 700 
(2005); Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball Club, LLC, 216 P.3d 827 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009); and 
Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 148 N.M. 646, 241, P.3d 1086 (2010). 
The cases cited by Mr. Rountree are not compelling. Phelps is a post-conviction relief 
case and has nothing do with foul ball litigation, Crespin was overruled by Edward c., and 
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Maisonave was superseded by statute. Edward C. is the only case cited by Mr. Rountree that has 
any precedential value and draws a distinction between so-called Open-Bleacher Seating and 
Multi-Purpose Areas. As discussed supra, the facts in Edward C. can be distinguished from the 
facts in this lawsuit on a number of levels. Regardless, attempting to draw a distinction between 
Open-Bleacher Seating and Multi-Purpose Areas when defIning the parameters of foul ball 
litigation creates more questions than it answers and essentially ensures foul ball litigation will 
continue to be a factual question for the jury to decide.6 
Other than Edward c., there are no cases discussing the limited duty rule that draw a 
distinction between so-called Open-Bleacher Seating and Multi-Purpose Areas. See supra, fn. 4. 
In fact, the Nevada Supreme Court in Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entertainment, UC, 180 P.3d 
1172 (Nev. 2008) recently addressed the limited duty rule in the context of a lawsuit very similar 
to this lawsuit and made no such distinction. Likewise, the Michigan Court of Appeals in 
Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 246 Mich.App. 645, 635 N.W.2d 219 (2001) made no such 
distinction, nor did the Utah Supreme Court in Lawson ex ref. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, 
Inc., 901 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1995). 
6 For instance, how are walkways, stairways, concession areas, souvenir areas, viewing 
areas (such as the Executive Club), restaurant areas (such as the Hawks Nest), entrance areas, and 
parking lot areas treated using such classifIcations? A Multi-Purpose Area classification could 
not simply include all areas where anything other than viewing the field of play could occur, 
because socializing, eating, and drinking occur in almost all areas of every baseball stadium 
across the country, including Memorial Stadium. 
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Moreover, as discussed supra, jurisdictions that have codified the limited duty rule do not 
draw a distinction between Open-Bleacher Seating and Multi-Purpose Areas. In Respondent's 
Brief, Mr. Rountree states that this is evidence of "how little deliberation must have been given 
to them." (See Respondent's Brief, pp. 31-32.) Such a distinction would only muddy the waters 
of foul ball litigation further and dilute the rule. In fact, this is evidenced by the fact that the New 
Jersey Legislature codified the limited duty rule specifically to undo such a distinction drawn by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Maisonave. 
Regardless, even if the Court chose to follow in the footsteps of the New Mexico 
Supreme Court and adopt a limited duty rule but draw a distinction between so-called Open-
Bleacher Seating and Multi-Purpose Areas, it is unclear whether drawing such a distinction 
would nonetheless still preclude Mr. Rountree's lawsuit under these circumstances. The 
Executive Club stops serving food and beverages before the beginning of each game and, at that 
point, acts only as an alternative location for people to watch the game without the obstruction of 
barrier netting. (Rahr Aff., 19, R. Vol. I, p. 551.) It is undisputed that while in the Executive 
Club and immediately prior to being hit by a foul ball, Mr. Rountree was not sitting, eating, or 
drinking. (See Evett Aff., Ex. A (Deposition of Bud Rountree), 66:7-17; 74:8-16; and 101:23-25, 
R. Vol. I, pp. 441; 443; and 450.) Rather, Mr. Rountree was in the Executive Club standing and 
socializing when the foul ball hit him in the right eye. (See id.) If someone chooses to tum their 
attention away from the field of play at a baseball game to socialize, there is obviously a risk they 
-16-
could be struck by a foul ball. This is true regardless of whether Mr. Rountree was in the 
Executive Club or his season ticket seats.7 
Mr. Rountree appreciated that there was a risk of being struck by a foul ball at Memorial 
Stadium, including in the Executive Club. This is evidenced by his extensive familiarity with 
baseball in general and the Boise Hawks and Memorial Stadium in particular. (See supra, p. 8, 
fn. 3; see also Appellants' Brief, pp. 8-17.) 
Distinguishing between different parts of the stadium, as Mr. Rountree suggests, creates a 
"shifting or movable duty of care," which changes a baseball stadium owner or operator's duty of 
care at the spectator's impulse. See Turner, 180 P.3d at 1176. Only one duty of care should 
apply with respect to the general "peril of objects leaving the playing field." See id. 
As such, the Boise Hawks respectfully request that the Court bring Idaho in line with the 
vast majority of other jurisdictions, which reflect a general consensus that baseball club owners 
or operators should not be held liable for injuries to spectators that result from baseballs leaving 
the field of play - at least if adequate safety screening has been provided to protect areas of the 
stadium in the vicinity of home plate, where the danger is thought to be most acute. 
7 If the fact that Mr. Rountree was "socializing" in the Executive Club, an area dedicated 
to viewing the baseball game once it begins, makes that area a Multi-Purpose Area, then every 
area of Memorial Stadium would be considered a Multi-Purpose Area because socializing occurs 
everywhere in the stadium. 
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B. The Court Should Find That Primary Implied Assumption of Risk Remains a 
Viable Defense in Idaho. 
There has been no ruling by the Court that primary implied assumption of risk has been 
abolished in Idaho. Rather, the Court in Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 695 P.2d 369 (1985) 
only rejected implied assumption of risk in the secondary sense, i.e., as a form of contributory 
negligence. See Winn, 116 Idaho at 503, 777 P.2d at 725 ("Our reading of Salinas convinces us, 
however, that any implied rejection of assumption of the risk in the "primary sense" by the 
majority there was only dicta.") While the Winn Court decided not to premise its decision to 
adopt the fireman's rule on the doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk, the issue 
nonetheless remains unsettled. 
As discussed in Appellants' Brief, assumption of risk in its primary sense is an alternative 
expression for the proposition that defendant was not negligent; that is, there was no duty owed 
or there was no breach of an existing duty. See, e.g., Lawson ex rei. Lawson, 901 P.2d at 1016. 
Stated another way, primary implied assumption of risk is commonly understood to arise when a 
plaintiff impliedly assumes those risks that are inherent to a particular activity.8 See, e.g., Turner, 
180 P.3d at 1177 (citing Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation, 333 S.C. 71,508 S.E.2d 565, 
569-71 (1998». 
8 The concept of implied assumption of risk, in its "primary" sense, is frequently used 
interchangeably with the concept of "consent" - particularly in the sports setting. See, e.g., 
Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432,502 N.E.2d 964,510 N.Y.S.2d 49 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986); 
Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 185 Cal.App.3d 176,229 Cal.Rptr. 612 (1986); Hunt v. 
Portland Baseball Club, 207 Or. 337, 296 P.2d 495 (Or. 1956). 
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The holding in Salinas is now almost thirty years old and the Court has not revisited the 
issue of "consent" since that time. Considering the language in Winn, a case that was decided 
four years after Salinas, and the district court's ruling on this issue in its Memorandum Decision 
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment entered on May 23, 2011, there is an apparent 
conflict between Salinas and Winn. As such, the Boise Hawks now seek clear guidance on 
whether primary implied assumption of risk remains a viable defense in Idaho. 
fu Respondent's Brief, Mr. Rountree suggests that primary implied assumption of risk 
conflicts with comparative fault principles. (See Respondent's Brief, pp. 37-38.) fu support of 
this contention, Mr. Rountree cites the Court to one case - Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 
399-400 (fud. 2011). While it does appear the fudiana Supreme Court in Pfenning rejects using 
primary implied assumption of risk terminology in the context of foul ball litigation, 
Mr. Rountree fails to direct the Court to the fact that the Pfenning Court did adopt a limited duty 
rule. See Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 403-04. Nonetheless, other courts have made it clear that 
primary implied assumption of risk does not conflict with comparative fault principles. See, e.g., 
Turner, 180 P.3d at 1177; Lawson ex rei Lawson, 901 P.2d at 1016; Arnold, 443 N.W.2d at 333; 
Alwin, 672 N.W.2d at 572-73. Rather, the abolishment of contributory negligence and the 
adoption of comparative fault only abrogated secondary implied assumption of risk. See id; see 
also Winn, 116 Idaho at 503, 777 P.2d at 725. 
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As stated in Turner, the doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk is "a relationship 
voluntarily accepted with an imputed understanding that the other party has no duty to the injured 
plaintiff." See Turner, 180 P.3d at 1177. The Turner Court then went on to state the following: 
We have clearly and consistently stated - since at least 2001 - that 
whether a duty exists is actually a question of law to be determined 
solely by the courts. Several other courts that have recognized duty 
as a legal question also have recognized that the primary assumption 
of risk doctrine merely goes to the initial determination of whether 
the defendant's legal duty encompasses the risk encountered by the 
plaintiff. These courts treat the doctrine as part of the initial duty 
analysis, rather than as an affirmative defense to be decided by ajury. 
In our opinion, this is a better application of the doctrine and one that 
makes it compatible with our comparative negligence statute. 
[d. This explanation makes complete sense because of the impracticality of "consenting" orally 
or in writing, particularly in certain contexts -like being a spectator at a sporting event. 
Even in a different but related setting, like where injuries are sustained by those engaging 
in participatory sports, the doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk has a very practical 
application. As discussed in Appellants' Brief, if Salinas abrogated primary implied assumption 
of risk, then sports participants in Idaho could be sued by a co-participant for injuries sustained 
as a result of voluntarily playing sports like baseball, softball, basketball, boxing, football, 
soccer, hockey, golf, lacrosse, martial arts, and others, despite the fact that there are inherent risks 
to these sports that are known to participants and they consent to accept by their participation in 
the sporting event. 
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In this case, the underlying factual record establishes the following: 
• Mr. Rountree grew up watching and playing baseball (See Evett Mf., Ex. A 
(Deposition of Bud Rountree), 47:4-22, R. Vol. I, p. 436); 
• Mr. Rountree helped coach his son's baseball team when his son was younger (Id. 
at 49:10-19, R. Vol. I, p. 437); 
• Mr. Rountree, a self described "avid Hawks fan," has been a Boise Hawks season 
ticket holder for approximately 20 years (Id. at 34:13-21; 43:18-25; and 44:3-4, R. 
Vol. I, pp. 433 and 435); 
• Mr. Rountree has been to over 200 Boise Hawks games at Memorial Stadium (Id. 
at 44: 12-45:6, R. Vol. I, pp. 435-36); 
• Mr. Rountree has handled somewhere between 1600 and 3200 Boise Hawks 
tickets that contain the language "the holder assumes the risk and dangers 
incidental to the game of baseball including specifically (but not exclusively) the 
danger of being injured by thrown or batted balls ... " (See Evett Mf., Ex. A 
(Deposition of Bud Rountree), 45:10-16, R. Vol. I, p. 436; and Rahr Mf., B 16, 
17 and 21, R. Vol. I, pp. 552-53); 
• Foul balls are a common occurrence at Memorial Stadium, not unlike any other 
baseball stadium, and are part of the game of baseball (See Rahr Aff., ':l[ 14, R. Vol. 
I, pp. 551-52; and Evett Aff., Ex. C (Deposition of Albert Stanton Tollinger), 
34:18-23, R. Vol. I, p. 483); 
• Mr. Rountree witnessed foul balls enter the areas surrounding the field of play at 
Memorial Stadium prior to August 13, 2008 (See Evett Mf., Ex. A (Deposition of 
Bud Rountree), 50:15-51:19, R. Vol. I, p. 437); 
• Mr. Rountree witnessed other spectators catch foul balls in the areas surrounding 
the field of play at Memorial Stadium prior to August 13,2008 (Id.); 
• At the time of the August 13, 2008, incident, Mr. Rountree had four season ticket 
seats in an area of Memorial Stadium where there is vertical barrier netting 
between his seats and the field of play (See Rahr Aff., ':l[ 19, R. Vol. p. 552; and 
Evett Mf., Ex. A (Deposition of Bud Rountree), 52:14-24, R. Vol. I, p. 437); 
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• Mr. Rountree chose not to sit in his season ticket seats on August 13, 2008 (See 
Evett Mf., Ex. B (Deposition of Linda Ballard), 30:17-32:5, R. Vol. I, p. 461); 
• Mr. Rountree voluntarily entered the Executive Club at Memorial Stadium on 
August 13, 2008, while the baseball game was being played (See Evett Mf., Ex. A 
(Deposition of Bud Rountree), 80: 13-18, R. Vol. I, p. 444); 
• The Executive Club provides an alternative location for people to watch a Boise 
Hawks game without the obstruction of barrier netting (See Rahr Mf., <J[ 9, R. Vol. 
I, p. 551); 
• Mr. Rountree had been in the Executive Club on several occasions prior to 
August 13, 2008 (See Evett Aff., Ex. A (Deposition of Bud Rountree), 68:22-24, 
R. Vol. p. 441; and Ex. C (Deposition of Albert Stanton Tollinger), 17:12-19, R. 
Vol. I, p. 479); 
• While in the Executive Club on August 13, 2008, Mr. Rountree told his 
grandchildren they could be hit by oncoming foul balls if they did not watch out 
(See Evett Aff., Ex. B (Deposition of Linda Ballard), 34:16-35:9, R. Vol. I, p. 462); 
and 
• Mr. Rountree was not paying attention to the field of play immediately before being 
hit by the foul ball on August 13, 2008 (See Evett Mf., Ex. A (Deposition of Bud 
Rountree), 74:8-16; 75:18-25; 101:3-14; and 111:1-4, R. Vol. I, pp. 443; 450; and 
452). 
These facts establish Mr. Rountree knew that spectators could be hit by foul balls at 
Memorial Stadium. Mr. Rountree knew of this risk, repeatedly and voluntarily exposed himself to 
it, and failed to take even the most basic precautions - such as watching the game - to protect 
himself from it. 
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C. The Parties Conceded at Oral Argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment That the Motions to Strike Were Irrelevant to the District Court's 
Summary Judgment Determination. 
In Respondent's Brief, Mr. Rountree raises the "additional issue on appeal" of whether the 
district court should have granted his Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Ron Anderson 
filed on May 16, 2011. Mr. Rountree's request in this respect disregards the record. 
At oral argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, counsel for the Boise 
Hawks conveyed to the district court that the motions to strike the affidavit of Joellen Gill and 
portions of the affidavit of Ron Anderson were essentially irrelevant to the district court's 
determination of whether to adopt the limited duty rule and whether primary implied assumption of 
risk remains a viable defense in Idaho. (See Tr. on Defs' Mot. for Summ. J., Vol. I p. 9, 1. 23 - p. 
10,1.24.) Mr. Rountree's counsel did not disagree with the position taken by the Boise Hawks' 
counsel at oral argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and, in fact, presented no 
argument at all at oral argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Mr. 
Rountree's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Ron Anderson. (See Tr. on Defs' Mot. for 
Summ. J., Vol. I p. 9, 1. 23 - p. 10,1.24.) The district court accepted the parties' concession that 
the motions to strike were irrelevant to the district court's summary judgment determination and 
did not make a ruling in this regard. (See id.) 
At this point, there has been no ruling by the district court denying or granting 
Mr. Rountree's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Ron Anderson for Mr. Rountree to 
challenge. Nevertheless, even if there were a final judgment or order to challenge Mr. Rountree's 
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Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Ron Anderson, Mr. Rountree did not file a cross 
appeal on this issue pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 15. More importantly, even if this issue was 
ripe for appeal and a cross appeal was filed on this issue, Mr. Rountree has not demonstrated how 
striking portions of Mr. Anderson's affidavit would somehow alter a determination on whether the 
Court should adopt the limited duty rule, or whether primary implied assumption of risk remains a 
viable defense in Idaho. 
CONCLUSION 
The Boise Hawks respectfully request this Court adopt the limited duty rule and find that 
the Boise Hawks complied with the rule. The Boise Hawks also respectfully request this Court 
find that primary implied assumption of risk remains a viable defense in Idaho. 
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